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WHAT IS A “SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN” ON 
RELIGION UNDER RFRA AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT? 
GABRIELLE M. GIRGIS* 
ABSTRACT 
What is the meaning of a “substantial burden” on religion under the 
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (and its state-level equivalents)? 
This question is timelier than ever, as several pending cert petitions before 
the Supreme Court ask it to overturn the landmark decision that spurred 
RFRA’s enactment: Employment Division v. Smith, which held that 
exemptions for burdens on religion are not required from neutral and 
generally applicable laws. Whether or not the Court grants any of these cert 
petitions, judges will continue to need a clear and reliable method for 
identifying substantial burdens on religion. This Article considers several 
existing tests and proposes a new framework designed to remedy their 
shortcomings.  
Put simply, a court’s analysis of a substantial burden requires it to ask 
two questions: (1) What type of religious exercise does the law burden? And 
(2) what type of impact does the law have on that exercise? The Article 
develops answers to both questions, by specifying the kind of religious 
exercise that can be substantially burdened in the first place (what I’ll call 
obligation and substantial religious autonomy), and by sketching several 
types of substantial impact laws might have on religion (what I’ll call 
simply punitive, indirectly punitive, non-punitive, or preventive burdens). 
Only burdens that meet these two criteria together can properly be 
considered substantial. Taken together, these two prongs of the framework 
help us generate a taxonomy of at least eight different kinds of substantial 
burdens on religion.  
But a challenge remains: Would judicial application of this framework—
particularly, would asking what type of religious exercise the law burdens—
 
* PhD Candidate in Politics, Princeton University. I am grateful to Rick Garnett, Nelson Tebbe, 
Paul Horwitz, and John Inazu for opportunities to present earlier drafts of this Article at the Annual Law 
and Religion Roundtable at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law (2019) and the Danforth Center’s 
symposium on the Religion Clauses at Washington University School of Law (2020). Thank you to the 
participants of those conferences for their insights and helpful guidance. I would also like to thank Netta 
Barak-Cohen, Stephanie Barclay, Caroline Mala Corbin, Marc DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Robert P. 
George, Michael Helfand, Jessie Hill, Andrew Koppelman, Melissa Lane, Kim Lane Scheppele, Kevin 
Vallier, Theresa Smart, Eileen Reuter, and Molly O’Connor for deeply informative exchanges and 
comments on one or more drafts.  











violate the Establishment Clause? In response, the Article clarifies the kinds 
of Establishment Clause concerns one might have about any judicial effort 
to interpret the substantiality of a burden on religion. Ultimately, it finds, 
the proposed framework can withstand all those concerns. Finally, the 
Article shows more precisely how the framework would help the Supreme 
Court decide a number of recent and potentially forthcoming cases 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider this case from the Supreme Court’s last term: Patrick Murphy, 
a prisoner on death row, approaches his execution day. In prison he has 
converted to Pure Land Buddhism, and he has requested that his spiritual 
advisor, Rev. Hui-Yong Shih, be at his side in the execution chamber—not 
just in the viewing room—to help him preserve focus on his rebirth in the 
Pure Land as he passes into the next life. The prison says no, because Rev. 
Shih is not one of the many state-and-prison-approved ministers who can be 
present in the chamber. So when the day for his execution arrives, Murphy 
is to die in the chamber alone.1  
How should the Court have understood the religious liberty issues at 
stake here? At the eleventh hour, it granted a stay of his execution, requiring 
the prison to permit Murphy’s advisor to be at his side in the chamber. The 
Justices offered two grounds for this outcome. Justices Kagan and 
Kavanaugh supported the stay by appeal to the Establishment Clause, as a 
remedy for the religious discrimination inherent in the prison’s permitting 
advisors of other religious denominations in the execution chamber: “What 
the State may not do,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote, “is allow Christian or 
Muslim inmates but not Buddhist inmates to have a religious adviser of their 
religion in the execution room.”2 But Justice Alito, in his dissent from the 
stay (on procedural grounds), suggested that Murphy might have a case 
 
1. Patrick Henry Murphy v. Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice, BECKET, https://www.becketlaw.org/case/murphy-v-collier/ [https://perma.cc/4DUX-FX5F]. 
2. Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1476 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 











against the prison’s protocol, if he could show that “excluding Rev. Shih 
would impose a substantial burden on his exercise of religion.” 3  The 
complexities of Murphy’s case—and this judicial conversation about it—
drive home a question that has vexed courts and scholars from the time of 
the American founding: When should courts grant exemptions from laws 
that burden religious exercise?  
Federal law answers that question with the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA, which many states have adopted their own versions 
of), as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA). These statutes provide that exemptions are required whenever 
the law “substantially burdens” someone’s religion, unless (1) that law 
serves a compelling state interest and (2) burdening someone’s religion is 
the least restrictive way to achieve that interest.4 But this test, known as the 
test of strict scrutiny, raises a further question that is surprisingly 
underexplored both among U.S. judges and justices and in the fields of 
constitutional and political theory—a question that will be the focus of this 
Article: How do we determine what counts as a substantial burden on 
religion? 
Getting clearer about substantial burdens on religion is a key 
intermediary step toward solving the much bigger problem of exemptions. 
We need a good answer to this question not only as a matter of public 
policy—to understand the meaning of RFRA’s (and RLUIPA’s) 
“substantial burden” language in an age where religious liberty claims are 
ever more fraught and contested—but also, we’re quite likely to see, as a 
matter of constitutional law. RFRA introduced the substantial burden test in 
response to a landmark religious liberty decision by the Court in 1990, 
Employment Division v. Smith.5 There, the Court decided that neither courts 
nor state legislatures were required to exempt Native Americans from a law 
prohibiting the use of peyote, because that law was neutral in its aim (it 
didn’t target religion) and generally applicable to everyone.6 Prior to Smith, 
the Court’s precedent was just the opposite: any neutral and generally 
applicable law that imposed on someone’s exercise of religion was 
constitutionally suspect. Courts were expected to grant people exemptions 
from laws that burdened their religion, unless that burden satisfied strict 
scrutiny (as the least restrictive way to serve a compelling state interest).7 
 
3. Id. at 1484 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
4. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2018); Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2018). 
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
6. Id. at 878–79, 882. 
7. Some have debated whether pre-Smith burdens had to satisfy something less stringent than 












Why does this reversal in legal history matter? Because recent 
murmurings from the Court suggest it might be going back the other way. 
Quite recently, in a joint opinion authored by Justice Alito and joined by 
Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, Justice Alito noted the 
“drastic[]” reduction in free exercise protection under U.S. constitutional 
law since Smith, and implicitly invited future petitioners to ask the Court to 
reconsider that decision.8 Now, some petitions for a writ of certiorari do 
challenge Smith, with others likely to follow.9 If the Court were to reverse 
Smith, then it would need a clear and reliable method for identifying 
substantial burdens not just under RFRA, which is part of statutory law, but 
also under the First Amendment of the Constitution: burdens from laws that 
are otherwise neutral and generally applicable would most likely be 
subjected to a substantial burden test, and where they were deemed 
substantial, the Court would then have to apply strict scrutiny.  
Of course, the Court might choose to do something less than fully 
overturn Smith. But there’s at least a meaningful chance that the Court will 
fully reverse it, and that makes it important for us to ask what the future of 
free exercise jurisprudence would look like.10 
The goal of this Article, then, is to build a conceptual framework that 
courts could use to identify substantial burdens on religion, which would in 
turn help them decide when to apply strict scrutiny under RFRA or the Free 
Exercise Clause.  
 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1127 (1990); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1494–96 (1999). 
8. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct 635, 637 (2019). 
9. See, e.g., Ricks v. State of Idaho Contractors Bd., 435 P.3d 1 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018), petition 
for cert. filed, (U.S. July 10, 2019) (No. 19-66); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 
2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123). 
10. One might wonder why overturning Smith would raise the stakes of deciding the meaning of 
“substantial burden,” since courts already have to decide what that is now under RFRA (both at the 
federal and state levels). There are three possible answers: First, the question might have different 
answers under the Constitution as opposed to statutes. The right answer for how we should interpret the 
language of “substantial burden” in a statute might differ from the answer to the question of what kinds 
of burdens the Supreme Court was scrutinizing pre-Smith, because it’s at least possible that the standard 
tools of statutory interpretation (dictionary definitions; reliance on the legal context composed of other 
language in the bill and of other laws on the books, which will differ from state to state; legislative intent 
or purpose, according to at least some theories of statutory interpretation) would yield a different result 
than we’d get if we were just asking “what did the Supreme Court have in mind when it was looking for 
substantial burdens—i.e., what did it tend to treat as ‘substantial’?” Second, even if the answer to these 
two questions is the same, the scrutiny of substantial burdens under the federal Constitution would 
happen much more often, because it would be required for burdens imposed by any state or federal law 
or regulation—including state laws and regulations in states that lack their own RFRAs, and federal 
statutes in which Congress says the federal RFRA doesn’t apply. Third, the answer to the meaning of a 
“substantial burden” after Smith’s reversal would be set in stone, politically speaking, rather than subject 
to being overridden or revised by Congress or state lawmakers (a power Congress has exercised, for 
example, by clarifying—in response to some lower court interpretations of RFRA’s substantial burden 
language—that religious conduct does not need to be “compelled” or “central” to a religion to be capable 
of being substantially burdened). 











Part I presents three kinds of tests that legal scholars and federal U.S. 
courts have proposed to help identify substantial burdens. Each test fails 
when taken on its own, I argue, but together they help us articulate two key 
questions courts need to consider to determine whether a law imposes a 
substantial burden. First, about the kind of religious exercise that can 
experience a substantial burden in the first place; and second, about what 
the impact of a law on religious exercise must be to count as a burden at all. 
Only by considering these two questions together could we give courts a 
useful framework—or mode of analysis—for identifying substantial 
burdens.  
Part II answers these questions, and so begins to fill out the framework. 
First, I offer an account of two types of religious exercise—obligation and 
what I will call substantial religious autonomy—that are susceptible to a 
substantial burden from law if they are burdened at all; and second, I sketch 
four categories of impact the law can have on these types of religious 
exercise that would create substantial burdens on them. This yields a 
taxonomy, so to speak, of eight different kinds of substantial burdens on 
religion that we are likely to see under conditions of liberal democracy and 
pluralism.  
Some scholars, however, including those whose work I build on here, 
might contend that this way of evaluating substantial burdens violates the 
Establishment Clause. For judges to ask what kind of religious exercise the 
law burdens might seem a step too far. As Michael Helfand has argued, 
judicial line-drawing between burdens that are substantial and those that are 
not according to their theological significance for the claimant “runs afoul 
of core Establishment Clause prohibitions.”11 Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle 
share these concerns.12 And some scholars driven by this concern have 
proposed tests for substantial burdens that seek to prevent that kind of 
inquiry altogether,13  or have intimated that one solution to the problem 
might be a regime with no exemptions, period.14 Part III thus seeks to clarify 
what exactly are the establishment violations at stake in substantial burden 
analyses, and offers three possibilities. But the framework sketched in Part 
II, I maintain, risks none of them, and could inform not only legal and 
constitutional interpretation but also the fields of public policy and 
theoretical scholarship on religious liberty more broadly. 
 
11. Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771, 1787. 
12. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation: The 
Case of RLUIPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1916–17 (2011). 
13. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They 
Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94 (2017); Chad Flanders, 
Insubstantial Burdens, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 279 (Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber eds., 2018). 
14. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, Substantial Burdens Imply Central Beliefs, 2016 U. ILL. L. 












Part IV, finally, puts this framework into practice, applying it to explain, 
to re-envision, and to predict the outcome of past and future Supreme Court 
cases. The framework makes sense, for example, of the Court’s discussion 
of Murphy’s religious liberty claims, and gives us a better articulation of 
prisoners’ religious liberty rights more generally. It also better explains the 
Court’s internal disagreement over the meaning of a substantial burden 
under RFRA in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.15 It gives us new reasons to think 
that some of the Court’s pre-Smith cases on minority religious liberty rights 
were wrongly decided, or at least should have required strict scrutiny 
analysis. And finally but perhaps most importantly, it helps us chart the way 
forward from the cert petitions that are now asking the Court to reverse its 
biggest religious liberty decision in the twentieth century. 
I. THREE TESTS FOR IDENTIFYING SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS ON RELIGION 
Courts and legal scholars have proposed a range of tests for substantial 
burdens on religion under RFRA. Here I’ll focus on three kinds that I think 
narrow in on what’s most important for courts to consider in substantial 
burden analyses: what we can call the “religious substantiality” test, the 
“severe penalty” test, and the “pressure” test.  
A. Religious Substantiality Tests 
A “religious substantiality” test requires courts to ask what type of 
religious exercise has been burdened. Only certain kinds of religious 
exercise, under this test, can experience substantial burdens. Lower courts 
developed at least two kinds of religious substantiality tests when they 
began to interpret the meaning of RFRA in the 1990s. Under the centrality 
standard, for instance, burdens on religion are substantial if they forbid or 
penalize practices sufficiently central to religion. In Werner v. McCotter, 
the Tenth Circuit considered the claims of Robert Werner, a Native 
American prisoner, that a prison had substantially burdened his religion by 
refusing to give him access to (among other things) a prison-maintained 
sweat lodge and a medicine bag.16 The circuit court reversed and remanded 
the district court’s dismissal of those substantial burden claims.17 Why? 
Because, the circuit court suggested, access to the sweat lodge and 
possession of a medicine bag might be sufficiently central to Werner’s 
exercise of religion. Noting the case as an opportunity to interpret the 
 
15. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
16. 49 F.3d 1476, 1478 (10th Cir. 1995). 
17. Id. at 1480–81. 











meaning of RFRA’s “substantial burden” language, the court drew on other 
prisoner religious liberty cases to argue that: 
To exceed the “substantial burden” threshold, government regulation 
must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that 
manifests some central tenet of a prisoner’s individual beliefs; must 
meaningfully curtail a prisoner’s ability to express adherence to his 
or her faith; or must deny a prisoner reasonable opportunities to 
engage in those activities that are fundamental to a prisoner’s 
religion.18  
Werner had proved to the circuit court that “the sweat lodge plays an 
indispensable role in his own sincerely held beliefs,”19 and the court further 
realized that a rule preventing some prisoners from possessing a medicine 
bag might, “for those faiths for whom the symbol has sufficient 
importance,” count as a “substantial burden.”20  
Another kind of “religious substantiality” test is the compulsion 
standard: to show that the law has imposed a substantial burden, claimants 
must be able to show that the burdened practice is a strict obligation of 
religion. As Helfand shows, sometimes courts have used just one of these 
two kinds of religious substantiality tests, while other courts have combined 
them.21  We have in Bryant v. Gomez, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s 
explanation that:  
[T]he religious adherent . . . has the obligation to prove that a 
governmental [action] burdens the adherent’s practice of his or her 
religion . . . by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or 
having a religious experience which the faith mandates. This 
interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be 
substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to 
religious doctrine.22 
So in decisions like these, the lower courts started to interpret what a 
substantial burden on religion might be, by qualifying the kind of religious 
exercise that law can substantially burden. As I discuss further in Part III, 
Congress responded to these tests by broadening RFRA’s application: 
religious exercise did not need to be compelled by or “central” to someone’s 
religion to qualify as substantially burdened.23 And today RFRA defines 
 
18. Id. at 1480 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 1481 (emphasis added). 
21. Helfand, supra note 11, at 1785. 
22. 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (second, third, and fourth alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850–51 (9th Cir. 1987)). 












religious exercise as including “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”24 But even if we 
support Congress’s likely reason for these changes—which was to ensure 
that the courts’ metrics of “compelled” or “central” did not unduly narrow 
the law’s range of protection, especially for minority religions—we can still 
affirm and build on the courts’ instinct in crafting these tests, which was to 
find a way of distinguishing between trivial and non-trivial burdens on 
religion. Indeed, RFRA’s “substantial burden” language leaves courts no 
choice but to rely on some kind of guidelines for discerning that the 
claimant’s religious exercise can be significantly burdened. Religious 
substantiality tests, in other words, speak to the first prong of any proper 
substantial-burden analysis: What is the relevant category of religious 
“exercise” that laws can substantially burden? Of course, it’s unclear from 
the centrality test just what makes a practice central to someone’s religion, 
and a compulsion standard would seem to exclude too much. We’ll consider 
these problems further in Part II.  
B. The Severe Penalty Test 
First, though, I want to introduce two other helpful tests that legal 
scholars have proposed, so we can lay out the second type of question that 
courts need to be able to answer about substantial burdens. Helfand’s test—
which I’ll call the “severe penalty” test—identifies substantial burdens 
according to whether the penalty a law imposes on religious believers for 
noncompliance is substantial, either in the form of a tax, a sanction, or some 
other cost for engaging in religious exercise.25 For Helfand, we should favor 
this kind of test because courts either lack the capacity or are 
constitutionally forbidden (by the Establishment Clause) to adjudicate 
between different claims about the importance of a particular religious 
belief for a particular religion—a question that seems to be thoroughly 
theological and not secular-interpretive.26 So instead courts should look to 
the magnitude of the penalty a law imposes on religion.  
But the severe penalty test is incomplete. After all, before we can say 
that a law imposes a substantial penalty on religious exercise, we have to 
fill out the first prong I introduced above: we have to determine what counts 
as a religious exercise that can be substantially burdened at all. Otherwise, 
the severe penalty test would have us scrutinize, under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (and the Free Exercise of Religion Clause), laws 
that severely penalize even non-religious conduct (by telling us to look for 
 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2018).  
25. Helfand, supra note 11, at 1791. 
26. Id. at 1787–88. 











substantial penalties on any human pursuit). And more to the point, even on 
clearly religious conduct, some steep fines aren’t substantial burdens on 
religion. Someone who’s late for church might speed in order to satisfy a 
religious duty to get there on time, but surely the speeding laws don’t 
substantially burden her religion,27 as I’ll discuss in Part II.28  
C. The Pressure Test 
The incompleteness of the severe-penalty test points us toward the 
second prong of an adequate substantial burden analysis: What kinds of 
impact on religious exercise are substantially burdensome? Some legal 
scholars try to answer that question by offering yet a third test for substantial 
burdens: the “pressure” test. What singles out substantial burdens on this 
view isn’t that they impact a particular type of religious exercise (e.g., the 
“central” or “compelled” practices denoted by religious substantiality tests), 
or that they impose a severe penalty on religion, but instead that they have 
a specific kind of impact on religion: the pressure a law puts on religious 
people to change their beliefs or behavior.  
So Chad Flanders, for example, says plaintiffs have to meet a “bare 
burden” requirement: to get courts to consider whether a substantial burden 
is present at all, they have to show that “the government is doing something 
that pressures them to act in a way contrary to their beliefs.”29 Thus in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court rightly decided that the Amish should not be 
required to send their children to secular public schools, 30 because that 
requirement pressured them through coercive means (the threat of a fine and 
perhaps prison time) to act against their belief that their children should only 
be educated in Amish schools through the eighth grade.31 And Kathleen 
Brady suggests that in identifying substantial burdens, “[c]ourts should look 
for burdens that place significant pressure on the believer to change their 
behavior,” or for laws and regulations that “have the effect of requiring a 
believer to choose between following their faith and retaining or obtaining 
a good of substantial value.”32 
 
27. Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 131 (2015). 
28. And as it will be important for Part III to show, judicial decisions about whether the burdened 
religious exercise falls in the right category—about whether it is capable of being substantially burdened 
in the first place—needn’t violate the Establishment Clause. 
29. Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS, supra note 13, at 
1, 8.  
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
31. Id. at 299. 













We know from the severe penalty test, though, that pressure doesn’t 
cover every instance of what is at least intuitively a substantial burden on 
religion. In fact, Helfand and Flanders divide sharply over the Supreme 
Court’s controversial 1988 decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n 33  that the U.S. Forest Service could construct a road 
through lands held sacred by Native American tribes. While Helfand 
disagrees with this decision,34  Flanders supports it: “What distinguishes 
Yoder from [Lyng] is the idea that the Forest Service wasn’t really doing 
anything directly to the tribes, wasn’t making them do anything, wasn’t 
putting them to a choice between their faith and a penalty.”35  
So if we want to be able to explain why a case like Lyng also involves a 
substantial burden on religion even if the state isn’t penalizing or pressuring 
Native Americans (or claimants more generally), we need a better account 
of what effects of law on a given form of exercise count as burdening that 
exercise substantially. We also know, from the religious substantiality tests 
discussed above, that we need some idea of the kind of religious exercise 
that is capable of being substantially burdened in the first place.  
To sum up, then: the religious substantiality test, the severe penalty test, 
and the pressure test together help us articulate two parts, two prongs, of a 
framework for identifying substantial burdens on religion. What I want to 
do in the next part of the Article, then, is fill out this two-part framework, 
by asking: 
(1) First, what kind of religious exercise can be substantially 
burdened at all? 
(2) Second, which kinds of impact on those forms of exercise are 
substantially burdensome? 
Only if we have these two things together—if we know both the type of 
religious exercise at stake, and the type of impact the law has on that 
exercise—will we know how to identify a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.  
II. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS 
Below I propose an improved framework for courts’ substantial burden 
analysis, in two parts. First, I discuss two natural and pervasive tendencies 
of religion—its fragility and uniquely architectonic role in human life36—
 
33. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
34. Helfand, supra note 11, at 1804. 
35. Flanders, supra note 13, at 299. 
36. I draw these concepts from recent work on religious liberty by Sherif Girgis and Melissa 
Moschella; see infra notes 37 and 39 respectively. 











in order to identify two kinds of exercise that are likely to be substantially 
burdened if they are burdened at all. Those forms of exercise are obligations 
and what I describe as substantial religious autonomy. Second, I introduce 
four ways the law can impose burdens on these kinds of exercise—types of 
impact that become substantial when they threaten significant material (or 
in the last case, religious) costs. These categories include simply punitive, 
indirectly punitive, non-punitive, and preventive burdens.  
A. What Type of Exercise Does the Law Burden? 
To start, consider two examples that bring to light the importance of each 
part of the framework: of knowing what type of religious exercise is at stake 
and what kind of impact the law has on it.  
Example 1—Communion Wine. Let’s say a law forbids the consumption 
of Bordeaux in the U.S., and imposes a million-dollar fine for 
noncompliance. It so happens that Catholic parishes tend to use Bordeaux 
as the wine consecrated by the priest at Mass. But Catholics aren’t required 
to use Bordeaux; they are only required to use some kind of red wine. So 
we can say that the law burdens Catholics’ exercise of religion, and by 
Helfand’s measure it would surely be substantial, since it would impose a 
very steep penalty on their religiously motivated conduct—but surely no 
one would think this burden is substantial in the relevant sense. Why not? 
Because the impact on religion isn’t significant enough.  
Now take Example 2—Toll Booth. A toll booth happens to go up 
between your house and the mosque, requiring you to pay an extra fifty 
cents each way when you attend Friday services. Those services might be 
obligatory for you, in which case the booth burdens your discharge of a 
serious religious duty. But the burden doesn’t seem substantial in a way that 
warrants strict scrutiny. Why not? Because the material penalty isn’t 
significant enough. 
Both of these examples show us that even when a law burdens someone’s 
religion, knowing that the burden is significant or substantial requires us to 
say both something about the law’s extent of impact on the religious 
conduct, and something about the religious significance of that conduct.  
I’ll begin with the second issue. To address it—to figure out what types 
of religious exercise we should think are capable of being substantially 
burdened in the first place—we have to draw on some premises about what 
religion is like as a human good that the state has reasons to protect.  
We can find the seeds of such an account by returning to the lower 
courts’ religious substantiality tests. I think the courts developed the 
compulsion standard because they recognized that obligations generally 












just one way). As Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis have put the same point 
in an essay comparing religion to other human goods, like self-
determination:  
[I]f you’re barred from pursuing one project, you can adopt another, 
live out that new one, and your self-determination doesn’t take much 
of a hit. You need only a respectable range of options. But if you’re 
pressured into flouting even one of your perceived obligations, 
you’re stuck; your integrity is cracked.37 
Here Anderson and Girgis argue that religion is a “fragile” good: its 
demands tend to be rigid and precise, and so someone easily becomes 
deficient in her religion because it’s easy to fail to meet those demands.38 
This general feature of religion, they suggest, explains the need for any 
substantial-burden test to pick out laws that prevent or penalize the pursuit 
of religious obligations. So it seems reasonable, as a matter of political 
philosophy and legal tradition, to include obligations in the category of 
religious exercise that is capable of being substantially burdened. 
But I think that obligations aren’t the only conduct that might require this 
protection. This point may have motivated the lower courts that once looked 
for any conduct deemed “central” to a religion. This seems to be how they 
covered religious practices that aren’t mandatory but whose proscription 
still counts, intuitively, as a substantial burden. Indeed, some religions may 
not have any mandates at all: if only mandatory conduct were covered, 
those religions could be regulated out of existence without raising a legal 
problem.  
What should the category of non-mandatory but protected religious 
conduct include? Here again I think we can build from the ground up—by 
looking at the nature of religion as a human good calling out for protection 
at all. Anderson and Girgis argue that if religion warrants any legal 
protection, then religion’s relative “fragility” means that our substantial-
burden test will have to extend protection to religious obligations. I think 
we can craft another component of a sound substantial-burden test from the 
fact that religion tends to be especially or even uniquely “architectonic,” as 
political theorist Melissa Moschella puts it: religion naturally tends to 
motivate, direct, or organize many if not all other spheres of life.39 For 
whatever religion is, it surely includes, as paradigmatic examples, efforts at 
harmony with a higher or ultimate source of reality. Sociologists of religion 
 
37. Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif Girgis, Against the New Puritanism: Empowering All, 
Encumbering None, in JOHN CORVINO, RYAN T. ANDERSON & SHERIF GIRGIS, DEBATING RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 108, 135 (2017). 
38. Id. at 135–36. 
39. Melissa Moschella, Beyond Equal Liberty: Religion as a Distinct Human Good and the 
Implications for Religious Freedom, 32 J.L. & RELIGION 123, 132 (2017).  











such as Martin Riesebrodt and Christian Smith compellingly argue that 
seeking alignment or harmony with a superhuman power (or powers) is 
essential to religion as a category of human activity.40 And if this is true, it 
will easily be the case that quite a wide range of the actions of religious 
believers can be construed as efforts to preserve or advance that harmony. 
For insofar as the ultimate source is the ultimate ground of everything, 
including all that we are and could be and do, then believers might see every 
effort and action in some way as an effort to cooperate with that superhuman 
source of all meaning, existence, and value.41 That is why religion often 
spills beyond the bounds of conventional practices such as worship and 
prayer: it shapes choices about where to live, whom to befriend and to 
marry, how to raise children and where to send them to school, and which 
profession to pursue. Call these exercises of religious autonomy—decisions 
that religion has a natural tendency to motivate, direct, or organize in the 
lives of religious believers. 
Of course, even if the architectonic nature of religion means that every 
choice of a religious person is at least potentially an exercise of her religious 
autonomy, it doesn’t follow that every single action of a religious person 
equally warrants legal protection. But some of those exercises of religious 
autonomy—which are again, not obligations but still important exercises of 
religion because of their connection to fostering harmony with the 
ultimate—are surely hard to replace in an easily acceptable way: in that 
sense they are more significant or substantial (such as a choice about our 
professional path, or where to educate our children, or how to run a 
business). These kinds of opportunities are different from other exercises of 
religious autonomy in that they cover a wide swath of significant, decisive 
undertakings or pursuits that look different than they would if one were not 
in a perceived relationship to an ultimate source, or did not have beliefs 
about what that source asks or requires one to do with respect to other 
activities (activities in which, again, a believer might reasonably understand 
that source to be involved, since it is (perceived to be) the source of, 
ultimately, everything). To be pressured to cut short or give up religion’s 
architectonic direction of one’s life in these ways, say by avoiding particular 
lines of education or work, can leave a religious person seriously deficient 
in their experience or pursuit of religion overall.  
These are also some of the kinds of choices, I want to suggest, that are 
likely to be substantially burdened by law. In other words, it’s not just 
 
40. See MARTIN RIESEBRODT, THE PROMISE OF SALVATION 74–76 (2010); CHRISTIAN SMITH, 
RELIGION: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT WORKS, AND WHY IT MATTERS 6–7 (2017). 
41. Christopher Tollefsen, Conscience, Religion and the State, 54 AM. J. JURIS. 93, 99 (2009); 
see also Joseph Boyle, The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups, 43 












perceived obligations that the law can substantially burden: it’s also those 
significant or substantial exercises of religious autonomy. To put it simply, 
any adequate protection of religion as a human good (involving pursuit of 
some kind of harmony with ultimate sources of meaning and value) will 
have to take into account religion’s natural and inherent tendency not only 
to bind the consciences of believers but also to shape wide areas of the rest 
of their lives (their education, profession, relationships, etc.).  
To draw an analogy that further supports avoiding this second kind of 
substantial burden, consider that our law and policy frequently 
accommodate and make room for other goods to extensively organize and 
structure wide areas of human life—notably, for example, marriage. The 
reason the law does so, ultimately, is because of the nature and value of 
marriage itself, which gives it a similarly “architectonic” role: as a 
cooperative relationship between two people who coordinate across a wide 
range of activities, a marriage naturally plays that organizing role, and so it 
can’t be fully expressed unless it is given room to play that role. So the 
liberal state doesn’t just avoid compromising the freedom minimally 
required for living out a marriage at all (by respecting people’s freedom to 
choose their own spouse, out of respect for the consent required to form a 
valid marriage).42 It also protects a wide range of opportunities for marriage 
to direct people’s lives. Allowing couples to get married but then denying 
them freedom to make any decisions about how they rear their children (a 
freedom protected, for example, under the Constitution’s substantive due 
process right to direct the education of one’s children),43 or what they decide 
to share with each other but not with other people (a discretion protected in 
ours and many other liberal regimes by marital privacy rights, including 
testimonial privileges), 44  would fail to protect marriage adequately, by 
ignoring its natural tendency to organize other aspects of life. To respect 
that feature of marriage, the state needs to protect not just the initial 
instantiation of marriage (our freedom to choose whom to consent to marry), 
but also, at least to some extent, its natural expression, which is to regulate 
many features of the common life shared by those who marry each other.  
So too with religion, another relationship in which someone is (or 
understands herself to be) coordinating with a source or being across a 
number of spheres: to guarantee sufficient access to this good, the state 
should protect not only the very beginning of its citizens’ pursuit of it (by 
leaving them free to choose whether to accept a particular religion’s set of 
claims about the ultimate source, and to carry out the strict obligations a 
relationship to that source might require); it should also protect a wide 
 
42. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
43. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
44. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77–78 (1958). 











sphere of freedom for religion to continue to do its architectonic work, by 
shaping many kinds of decisions. To do otherwise is a kind of violation of 
citizens’ substantial religious autonomy (as opposed to their strict 
obligations of conscience). It interferes with their discretion over the 
significant contributions that religion makes to their lives; with the 
organizing role it plays. 
Just how wide that sphere needs to be—the kinds of encroachments on 
this broader sense of free exercise that the state should avoid and which 
should be subject to strict scrutiny when they arise—should depend, as I’ve 
suggested, on whether a law urges citizens to give up a substantial 
opportunity for religion to organize their lives. And “substantiality” in this 
sense should be judged from within a person’s faith tradition. Suppose that 
as a matter of religion, you consider it very important to be able to preach 
about your faith, but you have only a slight preference (not a strong one, 
much less a perceived obligation) to evangelize on a quiet neighborhood 
street in the middle of the night.45 That slight preference doesn’t entail that 
neutral and reasonable noise ordinances should be subject to heightened 
scrutiny when applied to you. By your own religious lights (by hypothesis), 
your experience of religion won’t be substantially worse off if you carry out 
your evangelizing work in a different way: during the day, during a set 
period of hours in which noise is permitted. By contrast, when your 
relationship to an ultimate source leads you to think you have a vocation 
specifically to devote your life to running a school, or a business, or a 
charitable organization, according to your religious principles, you might 
well be substantially worse off in your experience or pursuit of religion if a 
law urges you to give up that form of religious exercise.  
In short, even if both the choice to evangelize at this time rather than that 
one, and the choice to run a charitable organization along one set of 
principles (or vision of the good) rather than another, are exercises of 
discretion, only the second (on the hypothetical facts described above) 
involves discretion we can reasonably call, for these purposes, substantial;46 
and so, in my view, only burdens on the second would warrant heightened 
scrutiny.  
So by thinking about the nature of religion, we can give courts a better 
picture of what practices might be capable of being substantially burdened 
 
45. For a similar example, put to different purposes, see Anderson & Girgis, supra note 37, at 
132. 
46. Some would probably argue that this distinction just shifts the focus of judicial decisions 
about what’s a substantial burden, and doesn’t get around the Establishment Clause problems that might 
be inherent to substantial burden analysis. For reasons I explain further in Part III, I think the distinction 
can withstand that objection. For now, it’s worth pointing out that the concept of substantiality is used 
in many other areas of law, as indeterminate as it often seems. And the point of this Article is to show 












by law: not only religious obligations but also significant or substantial 
exercises of religious autonomy.  
B. What Type of Impact Does the Law Have on Religion? 
But to complete the framework, we need the other half of the picture, 
which the penalty and pressure tests begin to sketch. We need to know the 
types of impact law can have on religion that could be substantially 
burdensome (as opposed to the light burden imposed in the Toll Booth 
example). And to answer that question, we need to know what kinds of 
impact might make religious obligations or substantial autonomy too 
expensive. I want to propose four possible categories of this kind of 
substantial impact that law might have on religion. This will help us 
complete the framework: we will end up with a taxonomy of at least eight 
different types of substantial burdens that courts could use (two categories 
of religious exercise times four types of impact the law can have on those 
kinds of exercise). I’ll then be able to apply this framework in a discussion 
of past and possible future Supreme Court cases in Part IV.  
How do the penalty and pressure tests come into play? The first three 
categories of impact I’m about to describe are organized around different 
ways the law can set the cost of religious exercise too high by pressuring 
people to give it up, sometimes by threatening a penalty, but also, 
sometimes, by withholding access to a benefit. Substantial burdens in these 
three categories will meet Helfand’s severe penalty criterion: the material 
cost they impose on religious exercise will be significant.  
The fourth category is one that I’ve already suggested the pressure test 
leaves out entirely: it captures the total prevention of religious exercise that 
minority religions and religious prisoners (who don’t face the same range 
of options as ordinary citizens) are especially likely to experience.47  
Burdens imposed by laws in these categories, I should also clarify, are 
incidental burdens (side effects of laws that are designed to be neutral and 
generally applicable—I’m not referring here to laws that burden religion 
intentionally, with the aim of targeting or discriminating against them). But 
we should count them substantial, in any given case, when and because they 
 
47. Helfand addresses the objection that his proposed test won’t cover these burdens by arguing 
that they are even clearer cases of substantial burdens.  
In cases like Lyng . . . a law has imposed an even more significant burden on religious exercise. 
Instead of providing an option to engage in religious exercise and then endure a significant 
sanction, tax or penalty, the law refuses even that option. And in so doing, such laws . . . ought 
to be understood as constituting a substantial burden. What those laws have done is leave a 
person in a position that is even worse than enduring a substantial burden; they are actually 
coercing a person’s failure to engage in religious exercise. 
Helfand, supra note 11, at 1805. 











make someone’s religion costly enough that she is pressured (or forced, in 
the last category) to become deficient in her experience of it (by failing to 
carry out her obligations, or a substantial form of religious autonomy). That 
is the feature they all share that explains why each of them can contribute 
to a substantial burden on religion.  
The first kind of burden, then, we can call “simply punitive.” This 
includes laws that force religious citizens to choose between two options: 
their religious exercise—whether that’s an obligation or substantial 
religious autonomy—and a criminal penalty or other punishment. One 
example of a simply punitive substantial burden would be the law at issue 
in Employment Division v. Smith.48 That law banned peyote use by religious 
and nonreligious alike (it was generally applicable), and there was no 
indication it was motivated by hostility to the members of the Native 
American religion who consumed it in their worship rituals (so it was 
neutral in aim).49 Still, the law pressured them to give up a substantial form 
of religious autonomy (discretion over a central element of their worship 
rituals) by setting as the price of that exercise of their religion a significant 
criminal punishment: punishment for a felony.50 
The second kind of burden, which we might label “indirectly punitive,” 
forces citizens to choose from a slightly wider set of options: (a) to violate 
their religious obligations or their substantial religious autonomy; (b) to 
accept a criminal or civil penalty; or (c) to accept a significant cost of a third 
kind, giving up access to a public benefit or entitlement that would 
otherwise be available to them, including the exercise of other civil rights 
or liberties, such as freedom of movement, speech, or association. The 
choices in short are religious exercise, legal punishment, or benefit.51 
What kinds of laws might create indirectly punitive substantial burdens? 
Sabbatarian laws are one plausible example. These would incidentally 
require a Jewish business to close on Sunday by requiring all businesses to 
close on Sunday, and thereby pressure Jewish business owners into a 
trilemma: they must choose between giving up an exercise of substantial 
religious autonomy (by giving up running a business in accordance with 
their belief that the Sabbath falls on Saturday), a fine for non-compliance 
(by opening on Sunday), or surrendering their ability to run a business on 
equal or competitive terms (by closing on Saturday and Sunday). 52 
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49. Id. at 878. 
50. Id. at 874. 
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“Indirectly punitive” laws might also include bans on certain forms of attire 
in public spaces that would incidentally require some Muslim women to 
choose among an aspect of religious autonomy (e.g., the choice to wear a 
niqab in public), a punitive sanction, and freedom of movement in certain 
public spaces.53 Other indirectly punitive burdens might arise from anti-
discrimination laws designed to ensure equal access to certain goods or to 
prevent dignitary harm to certain historically marginalized groups of people. 
When these laws have the incidental effect of, say, requiring a business 
owner to provide services that violate her religious conscience, they create 
another trilemma: the business person must choose among her religious 
obligations, a fine for non-compliance with the antidiscrimination law 
applicable to her business, or a surrender of the associational and other 
interests involved in operating the business.54  
Third, there are also what we could call “non-punitive” burdens: burdens 
imposed by laws that are not backed by any punishment at all. This category 
includes laws that force a choice between someone’s religion (whether 
obligation or substantial religious autonomy) and access to a public benefit. 
Sherbert v. Verner55 presents us with a non-punitive substantial burden. 
There, Justice Brennan argued for the majority that the EEOC could not 
refuse Adell Sherbert a significant benefit (unemployment compensation) 
after she was fired from her job for her refusal to work on Saturday (the day 
she, as a Seventh Day Adventist, understood to be the Sabbath).56 Denying 
her this compensation, Brennan wrote, “forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept 
work, on the other hand.”57  Another case that suggests a non-punitive 
substantial burden is Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer: 
here, the Court upheld a Lutheran church-affiliated school’s challenge to 
Missouri’s constitutional prohibition on giving public funds to churches, 
 
because, due to the statute’s compulsion to close on Sunday, appellants will suffer substantial economic 
loss, to the benefit of their non-Sabbatarian competitors, if appellants also continue their Sabbath 
observance by closing their businesses on Saturday; that this result will either compel appellants to give 
up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet of the Orthodox Jewish faith, or will put appellants at a serious 
economic disadvantage if they continue to adhere to their Sabbath.”); see also id. at 600 n.1 (quoting the 
Sabbatarian law at issue in Braunfeld).  
53. See, for example, written comments from the NGO Liberty in the ECHR case S.A.S. v. 
France, which argued that the burqa ban put some Muslim women to “the agonising choice between 
remaining at home or removing their veil.” S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, 365.  
54. This part of the taxonomy I’m developing overlaps with Anderson and Girgis’s view of the 
burden at stake in Hobby Lobby. See Anderson & Girgis, supra note 37, at 138–40. Yet I’m arguing that 
the same trilemma extends beyond cases involving obligations to those involving substantial exercises 
of religious autonomy.  
55. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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and concluded that the state was required to consider Trinity Lutheran’s 
application for a public grant that would cover the costs of resurfacing the 
school’s playground. 58  On the framework constructed here, Missouri’s 
exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from consideration could be interpreted as a 
non-punitive substantial burden because it required the church to choose 
between substantial religious autonomy (running a school according to its 
religious principles) and access to a public benefit (state funding). As the 
Court argued, Missouri’s rule “puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It may 
participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious 
institution.”59  
Fourth and finally, I want to introduce “preventive burdens.” These are 
burdens on religious obligations or substantial religious autonomy not 
covered by the pressure test discussed above. People can’t choose to opt out 
of preventive burdens in the way they can choose (albeit at a heavy cost) to 
opt out of burdens in the first three categories (by violating their obligations 
or autonomy, by accepting a legal punishment, or by waiving access to a 
benefit). And because they can’t choose to opt out, there is no pressure of 
the kind central to those other types of burdens: they are simply stopped 
altogether from exercising their religion in either of the two ways I’ve 
specified. As I’ll discuss more in Part IV, preventive substantial burdens 
could include prison policies that fail to accommodate prisoners’ religious 
obligations or substantial autonomy (say in choosing a minister to be present 
in the execution chamber), or some kinds of prevention of minority religious 
practices—e.g., road construction that destroys the integrity of land 
essential to Native American worship.  
Distinguishing these four kinds of substantial burdens doesn’t prove that 
they should all fail strict scrutiny analysis (which is required under RFRA 
for an exemption to be given in the end). All I’ve shown here is that courts 
would be required to apply strict scrutiny to laws within these categories 
that impose substantial material costs on (or entirely prevent) religion 
(obligations or substantial autonomy), not necessarily that lawmakers or 
courts would be required to give exemptions from those laws (for again, 
exemptions won’t be required where the law’s burdening of religion is the 
least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest).  
So to sum up, we now have a developed framework for identifying 
substantial burdens on religion. I’ve argued that two types of religious 
exercise reflect deep and pervasive natural tendencies of religion, and so 
must be protected if religion as a human good is to be sufficiently 
protected—and furthermore that law can substantially burden those 
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exercises of religion by pressuring people to give them up through threat of 
substantial material costs.  
III. WHEN DOES IDENTIFYING SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS ON RELIGION 
VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE? 
So far I’ve sketched a framework that would allow courts to identify 
substantial burdens on religion, in two steps: first, by determining the type 
of religious exercise at stake, and second, by asking what kind of impact the 
law would have on it. But I’ve not yet answered a crucial challenge that 
some scholars might pose: does evaluating the substantiality of a burden in 
terms of its particular impact on religion violate the Establishment Clause? 
In other words, someone might think that the first step—asking whether 
obligation or substantial religious autonomy is at stake—is a kind of 
religious substantiality test (outlined in Part I) that the Establishment Clause 
forbids. Answering that concern here will be useful in two ways. First, it 
will help us get clearer on just what establishment violations might be at 
risk in substantial burden analyses—a problem already debated in the legal 
literature, but which lacks a clear resolution. And second, addressing this 
objection will show us just how courts might put this framework into 
practice.  
Avoiding establishment violations is the prime motivation for Helfand’s 
severe penalty test, and more broadly the reason for some scholars’ concern 
that RFRA’s language invites them. “Courts lack the tools to engage in line 
drawing when it comes to determining and calibrating the degree of 
theological impact a particular law imposes on religion,” Helfand writes.60 
Similarly, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle contend that while state agents are 
permitted to ask questions about whether a particular activity is religious or 
whether it has “been burdened in some legal sense,” questions “involving 
the religious substantiality of the burden” are “jurisdictionally off-limits.”61 
“A jurisprudence that propels judges into the evaluation of such questions,” 
they argue, “is a contra-constitutional excursion into appraising theological 
questions, as well as an exercise in amateur sociology.”62 So we have here 
at least two establishment-related concerns about judicial efforts to identify 
substantial burdens according to the type of exercise they impact: (1) that 
judges are incompetent and/or ill-trained to make that assessment; and (2) 
that judges are restrained by the Constitution from asking these sorts of 
questions. 
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Perhaps the first kind of concern explains the second: the reason the 
Establishment Clause could be interpreted to prevent judges from asking if 
a legal burden impacts someone’s obligations or her substantial religious 
autonomy, but not from asking, say, whether it takes too much out of her 
wallet (as per Helfand’s test), is that judges simply aren’t equipped by their 
professional background to decide the first kind of question. Even apart 
from judicial overreach, though, I think we can articulate at least two further 
Establishment Clause violations that might be inherent to the framework 
I’ve offered, only to see that the framework can withstand all three of them. 
The first concern is that asking whether a law has burdened religious 
obligations or substantial autonomy could lead courts to discriminate among 
religions. As the Court insisted in Larson v. Valente: “The clearest 
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 
cannot be officially preferred over another.”63 One might think judges will 
be more likely to gauge what counts as an “obligation” or “substantial 
autonomy” according to their experience or knowledge of mainstream 
religions, and the protection and accommodation of minority religious 
practices (which judges might more easily misunderstand) will be more 
likely to slip through the cracks. Indeed, this kind of concern about the 
protection of minority religious practices seems to have led Congress to 
clarify RFRA’s language in 1999: responding to the compulsion and 
centrality standards developed by the lower courts, Congress explained that 
“the burdened religious activity [under RFRA] need not be compulsory or 
central to a religious belief system.”64 And RFRA now defines a “religious 
exercise” as including “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled 
by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”65  
I highly doubt, however, that the first step of the framework I’m 
proposing would encourage discrimination of this kind. First, because the 
point of distinguishing obligation from substantial autonomy is precisely to 
cover a wider range of practices, including those not part of traditional or 
mainstream religions, than what the centrality standard protected in its 
earliest (and all-too-vague) articulation. And second, the framework’s 
specification of religious exercise that can be substantially burdened leaves 
less room for judicial misunderstanding of (or worse, aversion to) minority 
religions to bias the analysis.  
The second kind of establishment concern one might raise is that by 
using a religious substantiality test like mine (by asking whether the 
burdened activity is either an obligation or a substantial exercise of 
autonomy), courts will end up endorsing a particular view about what a 
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religion teaches, by favoring one interpretation of what a religion requires 
or invites its believers to do over another. Prior to RFRA’s enactment and 
the lower courts’ effort to interpret its meaning through the compulsion and 
centrality tests, a long tradition in judicial interpretation held, as the 
Supreme Court put it, that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.”66  Or to take the 
Court’s opinion in Lyng: the majority rejected the dissent’s proposal of “a 
legal test under which it would decide which public lands are ‘central’ or 
‘indispensable’ to which religions, and by implication which are 
‘dispensable’ or ‘peripheral,’” as an occasion for the Court to hold “that 
some sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to 
certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious 
objectors who brought the lawsuit.”67 In other words, the Court rejected the 
possibility that it would have “to rule that some religious adherents 
misunderstand their own religious beliefs”—“an approach [that] cannot be 
squared with the Constitution or with our precedents,” and which would 
“cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.”68 
Of course, as we saw above, some think that the reason courts shouldn’t 
play this role is because they are incompetent to do so. Maintaining that 
courts are incompetent to use a religious substantiality test—in the above 
framework, a test of whether obligation or substantial autonomy is at 
stake—sometimes stems from a third kind of establishment worry, which is 
that it would too thickly entangle government with religion. In cases that 
would involve “judicial resolution of claims turning on religious doctrine or 
practice,” Helfand explains, “courts dismiss the plaintiff’s claims because 
adjudicating the case would entail constitutionally impermissible judicial 
involvement in the resolution of religious questions.”69 And the grounds for 
this “religious questions doctrine,” though of “ambiguous constitutional 
origin,” are at least for some judges to be found in the Establishment 
Clause’s prohibition of “excessive entanglement.”70 
On closer look, these two establishment concerns about endorsement and 
entanglement seem to boil down to one deeper problem, which Sherif Girgis 
has identified as the primary concern of most of the case law and 
commentary on this issue: that in trying to determine whether a particular 
burden is substantial, judges will end up displacing, or second-guessing, the 
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claimant’s own view of what her religion requires.71 And it seems there are 
several ways judges could do that: they could 
(a) say that a given theological proposition is true (or false, or 
reasonable, or plausible);  
(b) say that a given religious practice is spiritually valuable (or 
obligatory, or sinful, or worthless);  
(c) say that Claimant Smith is wrong about what her own religion 
says about (a); or  
(d) say that Claimant Smith is wrong about what her own religion 
says about (b).  
Someone might worry that the kind of questioning required by the first 
step of the above framework—asking if the burden falls on an obligation or 
substantial exercise of autonomy—necessarily forces judges to take a 
position on some of these things. But I don’t think this kind of second-
guessing is needed or even useful. All the first step of my framework 
requires is that judges decide, based on Smith’s presentation of her case, 
whether Smith feels religiously obligated to do the thing the law burdens, or 
whether she believes it would be substantially more spiritually valuable for 
her to do the thing the law burdens instead of something else.  
In this way, I think we can build on Marc DeGirolami’s suggestion that 
“[t]here can be no evaluation of the substantiality of a burden without some 
understanding of the place . . . or comparative importance of the exercise at 
issue within a religious system.”72  DeGirolami suggests that substantial 
burden analysis requires deferring to the claimant on whether the burdened 
exercise is more central or peripheral (and accordingly of greater or lesser 
significance) within the claimant’s “system of religious belief.” 73 
Obligations and substantial forms of religious autonomy are likely to 
occupy a more central place or greater importance within religious 
traditions—as indeed the lower courts seemed to think in the early years 
after RFRA’s enactment.74 I’ve argued that the centrality standard in those 
decisions reflects a deeper insight from the courts: namely, that respect for 
the good of religion requires protecting its distinctly fragile and 
architectonic role in human life, which tends to play out in the two forms of 
exercise I’ve described. It’s not the centrality or weight alone of a religious 
exercise, but rather the form of exercise that it is (obligation or religious 
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autonomy, both of which will tend to be central or important in many 
religious systems), that should help courts identify substantial burdens. 
In fact, in implementing the framework I’ve constructed, I think courts 
could adopt both parts of it by following something like Flanders’s proposal 
(which we considered but ultimately rejected in Part I). In their analysis, 
courts should first ask what type of religious practice the burden impacts, 
but defer to claimants—take them at their word—on whether that practice 
is truly an obligation or a form of substantial religious autonomy. They can 
interpret, based on things the claimant says about the exercise in question, 
whether it falls into the general categories of obligation or substantial 
autonomy, but they cannot take a view about whether the exercise is in truth 
required, or reasonable, or architectonic, or about whether the claimant has 
wrongly interpreted his religion’s position on any of those things. Then, 
courts should require claimants to meet something like Flanders’s “bare 
burden requirement,”75 but with broader parameters. Claimants should have 
to show that the law substantially impacts their religious exercise (either of 
the two kinds I’ve described), in one of the four ways I’ve presented: as the 
kind of pressure at stake in simply punitive, indirectly punitive, or non-
punitive burdens or more broadly the kind of deprivation at stake in 
preventive burdens.  
We now have better clarity on the possible establishment violations at 
risk in judicial evaluation of substantial burdens, and reason to think the 
framework proposed here would avoid them. What remains is a more 
thorough application of this framework to past and possible forthcoming 
religious liberty cases at the Supreme Court. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ANALYSIS UNDER RFRA AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Now, finally, how would this framework help us interpret not only the 
language of RFRA but also—as the Court decides whether to reconsider its 
decision in Smith—the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of free 
exercise? Some of the cases given as examples in Part II already show us 
how we might apply the categories sketched above. Here I’ll show at greater 
length how it might have shaped the Court’s analysis of burdens on religion, 
both in past cases and some that might come before the Court in the near 
future. 
Let’s start with a case that divides other methods for identifying 
substantial burdens that I discussed in Part I (from Helfand and Flanders): 
Lyng. There the Court decided to uphold state road construction through 
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lands integral to Native American worship.76 On the expanded framework 
developed here, the state imposed a preventive burden on a substantial 
exercise of religious autonomy. Native American worship doesn’t share the 
contours of monotheistic religions: it doesn’t carry identical concepts of sin 
and obligation and atonement. But preservation of land that Native 
American tribes held sacred would protect a significant opportunity for 
religion to organize and direct their lives: a substantial exercise of religious 
autonomy. The integrity, and more basically the adequacy, of their whole 
religious experience is entirely shaped by the land’s preservation.77 The 
majority in Lyng overlooked this: it argued that because the state’s road 
construction didn’t pressure Native Americans into violating any of their 
beliefs (as I would put it, in any of the first three ways described in Part II), 
there was no significant burden that needed relief.78 But as DeGirolami 
succinctly puts it: “There is no reason to think that a law burdens religion 
any less when it makes the exercise of religion impossible than when it 
compels action or inaction inconsistent with religious commitment.” 79 
Indeed, the essential importance of land to Native Americans’ religious 
experience certainly renders destroying the land’s integrity (absent a 
compelling state interest that can only be preserved by its destruction) a 
preventive burden. So the state’s prevention of their ability to exercise their 
religion altogether should have been counted a substantial burden, and 
subject to strict scrutiny accordingly.  
Another case the Court might look to to determine the meaning of a 
substantial burden under the First Amendment would be its decision in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.80 There a Christian family’s ability to continue 
operating its retail arts and crafts business according to the family members’ 
religious convictions (specifically, by offering employee health insurance 
plans that do not cover the cost of certain abortifacient contraceptives) was 
conditioned on their paying a fine of up to $475 million dollars a year.81 So 
the Greens, on this framework, faced an indirectly punitive burden on a 
religious obligation: the HHS mandate created a trilemma for them between 
violating their conscience (either by providing insurance coverage for 
contraceptives that could cause early abortions or dropping insurance 
coverage for their employees altogether); paying a fiscally crippling fine for 
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not complying with the mandate; or waiving their right to exercise another 
basic democratic freedom—of association, in running a business.  
The Court’s majority seemed to adopt this reading of the burden and 
subjected the mandate to strict scrutiny analysis.82 The Greens, it suggested, 
could only experience the associational benefits available to other citizens 
of incorporating their business if they either violated their religious beliefs 
in providing insurance coverage for abortifacient contraceptives, or violated 
their religious duty to provide their employees insurance plans in the first 
place by dropping insurance plans altogether. Analogizing the Greens’ 
burden to the one faced by Orthodox Jewish owners of small retail 
businesses in Braunfeld v. Brown, which challenged Pennsylvania’s 
requirement that businesses stay closed on Sunday (the owners already 
closed their stores on Saturday in keeping with their Sabbath), the Court 
argued that requiring the Greens to provide contraceptive coverage simply 
because they are an incorporated business would be like telling the Jewish 
merchants that by incorporating their small retail businesses, they must give 
up their rights to religious liberty protection (including an accommodation 
from laws requiring Sunday closure for businesses).83 “According to HHS,” 
the Court reasoned, “if these merchants chose to incorporate their 
businesses—without in any way changing the size or nature of their 
businesses—they would forfeit all RFRA (and free-exercise) rights.” 84 
“HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice,” it continued: “either 
give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo 
the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations.”85  
The Court accepted the state’s argument that the mandate served 
compelling interests in “guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged 
contraceptive methods,” but ruled that the mandate did not pursue those 
interests in the least restrictive way—the burden on religious exercise was 
unnecessary for the achievement of those interests.86 In short, the Court’s 
mode of substantial burden analysis in this recent RFRA case offers a 
template for how that same kind of analysis might proceed under the First 
Amendment, if Smith is fully overturned.  
The framework I’ve proposed could also broaden the scope of prisoner 
religious liberty rights. Because prisoners don’t face the same range of 
options as other citizens, they can’t be said to experience pressuring burdens 
(simply punitive, indirectly punitive, or non-punitive). To return to the case 
at the Article’s opening, prisoners like Murphy on death row aren’t going 
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to suffer a penalty for having a minister of their choosing in the death 
chamber, and they’re not going to give up some benefit in exchange for 
practicing their religion. So burdens on their religion will tend to be 
preventive ones. Indeed, on this framework, prison limits on the 
denominations that can be present in the death chamber are likely to impose 
a preventive burden on a substantial exercise of religious autonomy—at 
least for a number of religions that specify the importance of having a 
minister present at one’s passing (in Murphy’s case, it’s something close to 
a requirement for his rebirth in the Pure Land). So in deciding prisoners’ 
religious liberty claims, courts could require them to show that a prison 
policy or requirement completely prevents or deprives them of an 
opportunity to fulfill an obligation or organize their lives substantially 
according to their religion. They should defer to prisoners, as I argued in 
Part III, on whether the type of exercise at stake is truly an obligation or a 
substantial exercise of autonomy. 
Indeed, that deference and understanding of burdens on prisoners’ free 
exercise is exactly the direction tentatively recommended by Justice Alito, 
who dissented from Murphy’s stay on procedural grounds. While Justice 
Kavanaugh presented the stay as a remedy for religious discrimination 
(inherent in the prison’s practice of allowing Muslim or Christian ministers 
in the chamber but not Buddhist ones), Alito suggested that Murphy might 
have a stronger case that the policy substantially burdened his religion. He 
noted that Murphy “raises serious questions” not only under the 
Establishment Clause but also RLUIPA.87 For Murphy’s RLUIPA claim to 
succeed, Alito suggested, he “would have to show at the outset that 
excluding Rev. Shih [his preferred Buddhist adviser] would impose a 
substantial burden on his exercise of religion.” 88  And crucially, Alito 
recognized that to do this, Murphy would have to show that laws can 
substantially burden religion even when they do not force citizens to violate 
strict obligations of conscience: “We [the Court] have not addressed 
whether, under RLUIPA or its cousin, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA) . . . , there is a difference between a State’s interference 
with a religious practice that is compelled and a religious practice that is 
merely preferred.”89 He continued, while past cases such as Hobby Lobby 
considered “regulations that compel an activity that a practitioner’s faith 
prohibits,” and some Justices “have been reluctant to find that even a law 
compelling individuals to engage in conduct condemned by their faith 
imposes a substantial burden, . . . a majority of this Court has held that it is 
not for us to determine the religious importance or rationality of the affected 
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belief or practice.” 90  On this basis, Alito ultimately found his way to 
concluding, albeit tentatively,  
it may be that RLUIPA and RFRA do not allow a court to undertake 
for itself the determination of which religious practices are 
sufficiently mandatory or central to warrant protection, as both 
protect “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief.”91  
So Alito’s dissent actually pushes us quite clearly in the direction 
recommended by this framework. For he recognizes, on the one hand, the 
limits of a compulsion or centrality test to capture a sufficient range of 
substantial burdens people might experience on their religion; and he also 
sees, on the other, that judges are limited in their ability to carry out such 
tests. I’ve shown that we can solve both of these problems: first by 
broadening—and then specifying—both the kinds of religious exercise that 
we think can be substantially burdened at all, as well as the kinds of legal 
impact that might significantly burden religion. And second, by requiring 
judicial deference to claimants on the type of exercise at stake—by limiting 
judicial “tests” of substantial burdens to asking claimants to show that the 
law impacts their religion in one of four specific ways I’ve traced. 
Finally, to take a case that directly invites the Court to overturn Smith: 
Ricks v. State of Idaho Contractors Board is a case pending before the Court 
(at the cert review stage) in which George Ricks, an independent 
construction contractor, has objected on religious grounds to providing his 
Social Security number in his mandatory license registration with the State 
of Idaho.92 Ricks believes, on his understanding of the Bible, that “it is 
morally wrong to participate in a governmental universal identification 
system, especially to buy or sell goods and services.”93 In his petition to the 
Court, Ricks argued that the state has wrongly put him to a choice between 
full time work to provide for his family and practicing his religion. In 
making that case, he is challenging Smith’s holding that neutral, generally 
applicable laws—such as Idaho’s regulation requiring independent 
contractors to register with the state—don’t require exemptions for burdens 
on religious exercise. So, if the Court were to hear Ricks’s case and reverse 
its decision in Smith, it would have to decide whether the regulation 
substantially burdens Ricks’s faith in the relevant sense.  
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On the framework I’ve sketched here, the answer is yes: Ricks is 
experiencing a substantial burden on his religion because the regulation 
imposes a non-punitive burden on an obligation of conscience. It creates for 
him a dilemma between violating his conscience (by providing his SSN) 
and exercising a standard privilege of liberal democratic citizenship—to 
seek full-time employment. There’s no legal or civil penalty Ricks will 
suffer for refusing to provide his Social Security number, but he’ll have to 
give up the benefit of full-time work if he wants to continue his 
employment.  
The same analysis might apply to an older, pre-Smith case involving 
Native Americans’ objection to the use of Social Security numbers. In 
Bowen v. Roy, two Native American parents objected first, to the mandatory 
provision of their daughter’s Social Security number in an application for a 
government benefits program, and second, to the government’s use of her 
number in administering the benefits.94 The first requirement, on this new 
framework, could also be construed as a non-punitive burden on an 
obligation of conscience: it asks the parents to choose between violating 
their conscience (by providing their daughter’s SSN) or a government 
benefit (financial aid for families with children, and food stamps). But the 
government’s use of their daughter’s number does not seem to be a 
substantial burden covered by the framework, because there isn’t any 
religious exercise on the part of the parents or their daughter that the 
government’s use of the number either pressures or prevents.  
So there are at least several kinds of burdens on religion that the 
framework would not treat as substantial: (a) cases like Bowen, where 
there’s no religious exercise the law can be said to burden; (b) cases like the 
Communion Wine example, where the kind of exercise ruled out is 
insignificant by the religion’s own criteria; and (c) cases like the Toll Booth 
example, involving an incidental, minimal material cost to religious 
exercise (i.e., one not designed to target or discriminate against that 
exercise). 
In sum, we can see that the framework constructed in this Article could 
be applied to a wide range of religious liberty cases at the Court. I’ve 
suggested how the Court might interpret the burdens implicated in the above 
cases by telling us both how we might understand the religious exercise at 
stake and the law’s likely impact on it. But to avoid the establishment 
problems discussed in Part III, it would be important in every case for the 
Court to defer, ultimately, to the claimant on whether the burdened activity 
is an obligation or substantial exercise of religious autonomy. 
 













The Supreme Court has never needed as much as it does now a clear 
method for identifying substantial burdens on religion. The framework I’ve 
sketched here categorizes substantial burdens into four types of legal impact 
on two kinds of religious exercise. These kinds of burdens are all substantial 
because they all seriously undermine religion, understood as a human good 
that is uniquely fragile and architectonic. Whether it reconsiders its decision 
in Smith and/or tries to interpret more clearly the meaning of a substantial 
burden under RFRA, the Court could apply this framework to many 
forthcoming religious liberty cases.  
The framework also has implications for religious liberty cases under 
other liberal constitutional regimes. In Europe, for example, bans on 
wearing the hijab or religious symbols in courts or schools or even some 
kinds of public places could be understood as indirectly punitive burdens: 
they force Muslims and other religious citizens to choose between giving 
up their religious autonomy (or violating their conscience), a legal penalty 
(such as a fine or civic education classes), and full freedom of movement 
and participation in liberal plural societies.  
It’s worth addressing here a final question that might sooner or later loom 
large for the framework’s application: what about secular claims of 
conscience? It hasn’t been my goal here to argue that RFRA’s definition of 
religion should be expanded to cover these claims. But if it were expanded, 
or if the Court reverses Smith and then hears a case about an exemption for 
a secular conscience claim, we might ask ourselves whether the proposed 
framework would apply (assuming, of course, that the Court would decide 
in that case that the Free Exercise Clause covered such claims). 
I think it would apply. We could use the framework to assess whether 
burdens on secular conscience claims are costly enough in any of the four 
ways I’ve sketched. The analysis, of course, could not reliably predict the 
outcome of these cases, for it doesn’t tell us how courts should apply the 
test of strict scrutiny against the burdens they present. Indeed, the possibility 
of secular substantial burden claims drives home that the framework I’ve 
proposed has only been designed to help courts narrow in on truly 
substantial burdens, not to determine whether those burdens require 
exemptions. That is a much bigger question that remains largely unresolved 
in the legal literature, because we need a more comprehensive method that 
would tell us not only how to identify substantial burdens, but also how to 
gauge compelling state interests and least restrictive means. But perhaps the 
Court’s reversal of Smith would be just the sort of impetus we’d need to 
finally settle that debate. 
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